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Abstract
We assess the determinants of banks’ liquidity holdings using balance sheet data
for nearly 7000 banks from 30 OECD countries over a ten-year period. We
highlight the role of several bank-specific, institutional and policy variables in
shaping banks’ liquidity risk management. Our main question is whether the
presence of liquidity regulation substitutes or complements banks’ incentives to
hold liquid assets. Our results reveal that in the absence of liquidity regulation,
the determinants of banks’ liquidity buffers are a combination of bank-specific
(business model, profitability, deposit holdings, size) and country-specific (dis-
closure requirements, concentration of the banking sector) variables. While most
incentives are substituted by liquidity regulation, a bank’s disclosure require-
ment and size remain significant. A key takeaway from our analysis is that the
complementary nature of disclosure and liquidity requirements provides a strong
rationale for considering them jointly in the design of regulation.
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1. Introduction
Until recently, liquidity risk was not the main focus of banking regulators. The
2007-2009 crisis showed, however, how rapidly market conditions can change
exposing severe liquidity risks in institutions, many times unrelated to capital
levels. Now, there is wide agreement that insufficient liquidity buffers were a root
cause of this crisis and the on-going disruptions of the world financial system,
making the improvement of liquidity risk analysis and supervision a key issue
for the years to come.1
Consequently, efforts are underway internationally as well as in individual
countries to establish or reform (existing) liquidity risk frameworks, most not-
ably by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS). The BCBS’s
new regulatory framework (henceforth Basel III) proposes a short- and long-
term liquidity requirement to reinforce the resilience of banks to liquidity risks.2
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is a short-term ratio requiring financial in-
stitutions to hold enough liquid assets to withstand a 30-day stress period. The
second measure, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) aims at improving banks’
longer-term, structural funding. BCBS (2013) also requires institutions to dis-
close certain elements regarding their fulfilment of these minimum requirements.
Recently the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) has recommended national
supervisory agencies to intensify the supervision of liquidity and funding risks
as well.3
Despite the impact of these initiatives, little research has been done to under-
stand the fundamental determinants of banks’ incentives to hold liquid assets and
whether these determinants are affected by liquidity regulation. We attempt to
fill this gap by providing, to the best of our knowledge, the first global analysis
of the determinants of banks’ liquid asset holdings across countries. At the very
heart of our analysis lies the question whether the presence of liquidity regulation
substitutes or complements banks’ internal incentives to hold liquid assets.
Closest to our work are the papers by Aspachs et al. (2005) and Delechat et al.
(2012). However, both studies use limited datasets, the former a panel of 57 UK-
resident banks and the latter a sample of Central American banks, and focus
solely on the determinants of banks’ liquidity holdings rather than the additional
impact of liquidity regulation.4
We collect yearly balance sheet data for nearly 7000 banks from 30 OECD
1See for example Brunnermeier (2009) and BCBS (2008).
2See BCBS (2010) and BCBS (2013).
3Please see ESRB (2013) for further information.
4Dinger (2009) and Gennaioli et al. (2013) are other recent study dealing with banks’ liquidity
holdings. The former analyzes the impact of transnational banks on system-wide liquidity risks
while the latter analyzes the holdings of public bonds and the role of these bonds during sovereign
debt crises.
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countries over a ten-year period.5 While we do control for bank-specific, mac-
roeconomic and financial development factors, we are particularly interested in
the impact of banks’ business models, the strength of existing deposit insurance
systems, the concentration of the banking sector and banks’ disclosure prac-
tices. All four variables have recently received considerable attention from poli-
cymakers and academics in the context of reform proposals to strengthen the
resilience of banks to liquidity risks.6
Our results reveal that without liquidity regulation, banks’ liquidity buffers
are determined by a combination of bank-specific (business model, profitabil-
ity, deposit holdings, size) and country-specific (disclosure requirements, con-
centration of the banking sector) factors. The presence of liquidity regulation
substitutes most of these factors, making them insignificant determinants of li-
quidity buffers. An institution’s disclosure requirement and size, on the other
hand, remain significant.
A key take away from our analysis is that when implementing the LCR as
well as Pillar 2 liquidity frameworks in national legislation, policymakers need
to take into account that the need for and the reaction to liquidity regulation dif-
fers across business models as well as jurisdictions and therefore care needs to be
taken in tailoring the new liquidity requirements to fit the context in which they
will take their effect.7 Specifically, regulators should pay attention to disclos-
ure requirements when specifying Pillar 2 liquidity frameworks as well as the
accompanying guidelines to the Basel III liquidity rules. The complementarity
of disclosure and liquidity requirements provides strong arguments for regulat-
ors to jointly harmonize disclosure and Basel III liquidity requirements across
countries. The non-linear effect of size on liquidity holdings suggests that in the
presence of a liquidity requirement, regulators seem to pay particular attention
to the liquidity holdings of very large institutions. While this seems rational in
itself, care needs to be taken not to run the risk of neglecting some institutions,
which are, under certain circumstances, still large enough to pose a serious risk
to the banking system as such.8 A straightforward way to avoid this risk is to not
just look at size when defining global systemically important banks (G-SIBs).
While our study delivers novel insights into banks’ liquidity holdings, some
5Please note that we face the usual trade-off between broad country coverage and data gran-
ularity. While we decided in favor of broad country coverage, Bonner and Eijffinger (2012) and
Bonner (2012) are examples of using more granular data.
6See BCBS (2013) for disclosure, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) for deposit insur-
ance coverage, BCBS (2011) as well as CRDIV (2012) for business models and Aspachs et al.
(2005) for concentration.
7See for instance Bonner and Eijffinger (2012) or Bech and Keister (2012) who argue that
jurisdictions which implement monetary policy using the overnight interest rate face different
challenges when implementing the LCR than jurisdictions for which this is not the case.
8Lehman Brothers is a good example in this regard, as it was not amongst the largest while
still being systemically important institution.
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caveats need to be mentioned. First, data availability does not allow us to directly
draw the link from banks’ liquidity risk exposure to their risk bearing capacity.
Our dependent variable measures banks’ risk bearing capacity directly, while
banks’ business model, their profitability, deposit holdings and regulatory envir-
onment are only proxies of banks’ risk profile and therefore potentially subject
to a measurement bias. Second, our measure of liquidity holdings is very nar-
rowly defined which induces the risk of omitting certain variables, such as highly
liquid government securities. However, not all government securities are equally
liquid which implies that including them could lead us to mismeasure liquidity
buffers. Against this background, we are focussing on the variable cash and
due from banks, which is, by definition, permanently liquid in all markets. Fi-
nally, when measuring the impact of liquidity regulation, we cannot distinguish
between binding and non-binding liquidity requirements. Given, however, the
large panel structure of our dataset we expect that national regulation is binding
at some point for some banks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the
conceptual background of liquidity risk as well as its management and regula-
tion. Section 3 presents our data, to be followed by our results in Section 4, while
Section 5 concludes.
2. Conceptual Background
2.1. Market Liquidity vs Funding Liquidity
A first requirement to study banks’ liquid buffers is to find an adequate defini-
tion of liquidity. The financial economics literature distinguishes between two
concepts of liquidity: market liquidity and funding liquidity.9
Market liquidity describes a particular characteristic of an asset: a high de-
gree of market liquidity implies the ability to offset or eliminate a position in a
given asset at or close to the current market price. This feature of the asset may
not be constant over time. An asset which is currently market liquid may not ne-
cessarily have been market liquid in the past, nor need it be continuously market
liquid in the future. Factors such as market concentration or the prevalence and
distribution of asymmetric information may affect the degree of market liquidity.
Funding liquidity describes a particular characteristic of a financial agent: it
refers to its ability to meet obligations as they come due. Unlike market liquidity,
funding liquidity is a binary concept. At any point in time, a financial institution
is either funding liquid or not. Nevertheless, the two concepts are linked.10 Sup-
pose a bank only holds assets which are perfectly market-liquid. In this case the
9See Drehmann and Nikolaou (2009).
10Please see Brunnermeier (2009).
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bank will also be funding liquid, as long as it is solvent. Market liquidity, how-
ever, may vary over time, and an institution’s funding liquidity may thus change
accordingly. Suppose a sufficiently large portion of the bank’s assets suddenly
become perfectly market illiquid, while the bank remains solvent. The bank will
no longer be able to honor its short-term obligations and will become distressed.
This is, in fact, a stylized description of the difficulties encountered by a large
number of financial institutions when, in July 2007, the previously highly liquid
market for mortgage-backed securities dried up.
For the purpose of this study, we require a measure of market-liquid assets
held by banks to guarantee constant funding liquidity. Yet the example above
highlights the difficulty of obtaining a measure that adequately accounts for the
dynamic nature of market liquidity. To circumvent this problem, we focus only
on those assets in banks’ portfolios which - virtually by their definition - are
permanently market-liquid: cash and due from banks.11 We expect that this
narrow definition of liquidity captures banks’ qualitative choices about liquid
buffers.
2.2. Liquidity Risk
Liquidity risk refers to the risk that a financial agent will (at some point) be un-
able to meet obligations at a reasonable cost as they come due. In other words, it
reflects the probability that the agent will become funding illiquid during a given
time period. Since banks’ core business is to "borrow short and lend long" they
are especially prone to liquidity risk. Banks manage the liquidity risk inherent in
their balance sheets by maintaining a buffer of (permanently) market-liquid as-
sets - such as cash or government securities - which anticipates their depositors’
liquidity demands within the relevant timeframe. As pointed out by Diamond
and Dybvig (1983), banks thus benefit from the ability to pool liquidity risk over
a large group of depositors. It would be undesirable for banks to invest only
in perfectly market-liquid assets at all times as this would effectively eliminate
the pooling advantage banks have compared to the liquidity risk management
that could be undertaken by their individual customers. Yet, it would be equally
undesirable for banks not to invest in market-liquid assets at all, as this would
burden depositors with excessive liquidity risks. In other words, the determina-
tion of a bank’s optimal liquid buffer involves a trade off between self-insurance
against liquidity risk and the returns from illiquid, higher-yielding assets. Bal-
tensperger (1980) as well as Santomero (1984) for instance argue that the size of
banks’ liquidity buffers is determined by the opportunity costs to hold liquid as-
sets. Similar arguments can be found in Agénor et al. (2004) who show, using ag-
11Cash in this regard refers to cash at hand (not deposited, i.e. at the central bank) while due
from banks only includes non-interest bearing deposit accounts.
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gregate data for Thailand, that banks’ liquidity holdings are positively related to
the volatility of the money market rate, which proxies the need for self-insurance.
Unfortunately, we cannot observe liquidity risk exposure and banks’ invest-
ment opportunities directly. We can, however, observe banks’ structure and op-
erating environment as well as their realized liquid buffers (i.e., revealed pref-
erence). Based on the trade off described above, we can therefore hypothesize
as to the manner in which different firm-specific and environmental aspects of a
bank’s business should affect its liquid buffer. In particular, any observed factor
that would be expected to lower (raise) liquidity risk should reduce (increase)
observed liquidity buffers.
2.3. Liquidity Regulation
The aim of quantitative liquidity requirements is to ensure that banks hold enough
market-liquid assets to remain funding liquid over a pre-defined stress period.
The LCR for instance is defined as follows:
LCR =
High Quality Liquid Assets
Net cash out f lows within 30 days
≥ 100% (1)
High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) are composed of Level 1 and Level 2 assets.
Level 1 assets are considered to be highly market liquid and consist of cash,
central bank reserves and debt securities issued or guaranteed by highly rated
public authorities. Level 2 assets are of lower (but still high) market liquidity
and therefore receive haircuts between 15% and 50%. Level 2 assets include
highly rated non-financial corporate and covered bonds as well as certain types
of securitizations.
Net cash outflows are aimed to capture institutions’ liquidity needs over a
30-day stress period and are calculated as the difference between assumed draw-
downs of liabilities (including off-balance sheet commitments) and contractual
inflows. Maturing unsecured interbank loans for instance are assumed to run off
with a factor of 100% while retail deposits are assumed to run off only with a
factor between 5% and 10%.
In classifying certain assets as liquid and quantifying the liquidity risk of
banks’ liabilities, a liquidity requirement is likely to take away banks’ decision
on how to solve the trade-off between self-insurance against liquidity risk and
the opportunity costs from holding liquid, lower-yielding assets.12 As this solu-
tion might be different from the solution of the individual institution, liquidity
12Please note that in the time dimension, a non-binding liquidity requirement is likely to have
similar effects as a binding requirement. A formal requirement expects banks to stay above a
certain threshold at all times and hence, while a (at the time) non-binding requirement is unlikely
to have a major impact, over a period of 10 years it is still likely to change banks’ liquidity risk
management.
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regulation can either substitute or complement banks’ internal incentives to hold
liquid assets.
2.4. Key Variables - Contextual Determinants
With the the previous section’s considerations in mind, we discuss below the
likely impact of our four key contextual factors on banks’ liquid assets holdings
and how the role of these factors might change due to liquidity regulation.
2.4.1. Concentration
A higher degree of bank concentration implies greater systemic importance for
each bank within the economy. This, in turn, increases the probability that any
bank will receive public support, should it become distressed. In other words, it
reduces the effective liquidity risk faced by each individual institution thanks to
a larger (implicit) public guarantee. Consequently, we would expect a more con-
centrated banking sector to be associated with lower liquidity buffers. Repullo
(2003) for instance shows that the strength of the financial safety net lowers the
incentives for banks to hold liquid assets. Using a panel of 57 UK resident banks,
Aspachs et al. (2005) confirm this result when arguing that the likelihood of re-
ceiving support by the Lender of Last Resort reduces banks’ liquidity holdings.
Liquidity regulation might change the role of concentration in determining
banks’ liquidity buffers. Without liquidity regulation, institutions might hold
too low liquidity buffers as the risk of becoming illiquid is compensated by the
expectation of government support. Liquidity regulation forces institutions to
hold prudent liquidity buffers which are likely to be higher than the buffers held
by institutions that are considered to be too big to fail.
Hence, while concentration is, generally speaking, expected to have a negative
impact on liquidity buffers, liquidity regulation is likely to substitute this effect,
thus making it insignificant.
2.4.2. Disclosure
The banking literature frequently associates disclosure practices with market dis-
cipline. Greater transparency allows market participants to price institutional
strategies more accurately and, thereby, deter socially excessive risk taking by
financial institutions.13 In a market environment characterized by low transpar-
ency, financial institutions may find it profitable to adopt riskier strategies off the
back of uninformed customers or investors. By similar reasoning, we expect a
bank, which is subject to low disclosure requirements to manage liquidity risk
less prudently, thus reducing the size of its liquidity buffer.
With a liquidity requirement in place, the role of disclosure becomes more
important. A quantitative liquidity requirement gives investors a clear indication
13See for instance Jordan et al. (2000) or Nier and Baumann (2006).
7
whether a bank’s liquidity holdings are sufficient or not which is likely to make
disclosure requirements a complement to liquidity regulation.
2.4.3. Business Models
The impact of liquidity regulation on different business models is widely dis-
cussed. CRDIV (2012) mandates the European Banking Authority (EBA) to
monitor and evaluate the impact of the LCR on different business models and to
draw conclusions regarding the treatment of business models when implement-
ing the LCR.
Different banks hold different levels of liquid assets. These differences can be
caused by actual differences of institutions’ liquidity risk exposures but also by
differences of banks’ assessments thereof.14 In light of this, we analyze whether
the role of banks’ business models for determining liquidity holdings changes
due to liquidity regulation. Especially banks with business models that tradition-
ally require lower holdings of liquidity and systemically more important institu-
tions are expected to increase their liquidity holdings when liquidity regulation
is in place.
2.4.4. Deposit Insurance
Using the framework outlined above, we would expect the reliability and cov-
erage of the deposit insurance system to lower banks’ liquidity risk exposure
and, hence, their liquidity buffers. Ceteris paribus, increasing deposit insurance
coverage should reduce the likelihood of bank runs, an extreme form of liquidity
shock. On the other hand, deposit insurance schemes in most jurisdictions are (at
least partially) funded by the banking sector. Such a funding structure is likely to
exert market discipline as the individual institutions have more incentives to con-
duct peer monitoring. Hence, independent of liquidity regulation, the net effect
of deposit insurance is an empirical question: It either lowers liquidity buffers as
it reduces liquidity risks or it increases liquidity buffers due to increased market
discipline. The presence of liquidity regulation is likely to substitute the role of
deposit insurance coverage, thus reducing its significance.
2.4.5. Additional bank-specific, macroeconomic and financial development
variables
Along with our "contextual" factors, we consider several bank-specific, macroe-
conomic and financial development variables important determinants for banks’
liquidity buffers, mainly as control variables.
Using a large panel of US banks, Kashyap et al. (2002) find a significant
effect of bank size on liquid asset holdings. While Delechat et al. (2012) obtain
14See for instance Holmström and Tirole (1998), Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), Almeida et al.
(2004), Kashyap et al. (2002) or Rochet and Vives (2004).
8
similar results, Aspachs et al. (2005) do not find a significant effect of size on
banks’ holdings of liquid assets. A bank’s size can have a negative effect on
liquidity holdings given that large banks can be expected to have less volatile
cash flows (due to offsetting flows) and better access to different funding sources.
On the other hand, given their special role in the economy, large banks might be
particularly prone to peer and supervisory monitoring. Delechat et al. (2012) find
a positive impact of profitability on banks’ liquid asset holdings while Aspachs
et al. (2005) do not find any significant impact of banks’ profits. Delechat et al.
(2012) argue that it is easier for more profitable banks to fund themselves if
needed which makes them less liquidity constrained, thus reducing the incentives
to hold liquid assets. A similar result is likely to hold for capital, as more solvent
banks can be expected to have market access (at least to a point) even during
stress.
Banks face a trade-off between self-insurance against liquidity risks and op-
portunity costs of holding liquid assets. The macroeconomic situation can help
explaining how this trade-off is solved. Delechat et al. (2012) for instance dis-
cuss the cyclical behavior of liquidity demand. The authors argue that liquidity
buffers should be negatively related to real GDP growth, credit cycle and policy
interest rates. Such counter-cyclicality would limit the effectiveness of monet-
ary policy: if central banks inject liquidity to stimulate the economy, liquidity
buffers would increase but credit would not necessarily pick up. This discussion
is in line with Aspachs et al. (2005) who find that liquidity buffers are negat-
ively related to GDP growth and the policy rate. Similarly, Agénor et al. (2004)
find that excess reserves are negatively related to the output gap. The stronger
the presence of capital market frictions, the stronger the counter-cyclicality of li-
quidity buffers. Thus, Delechat et al. (2012) find that financial development and
the quality of institutions have a significant effect on banks’ holdings of liquidity.
A further argument for the importance of financial development for liquidity buf-
fers can be found in Almeida et al. (2004) who show that financially constrained
firms have a higher propensity to save cash. Hence, one could argue that lower
levels of financial development imposes financial constraints on banks, which
presumably increases banks’ liquidity holdings.
2.5. Institutional Liquidity Risk versus Systemic Risk
It should be noted that there is no direct mapping between our findings concern-
ing banks’ individual liquidity management and economy-wide financial risk.
In particular, the observation that "variable x reduces banks’ liquidity buffers"
should not be taken as synonymous with "variable x increases aggregate liquid-
ity risk". Indeed, a bank’s choice to reduce the size of its liquidity holdings may
be an individually optimal response to a reduction in economy-wide liquidity
risk, proxied by a variable such as the coverage of deposit insurance. The net
9
effect of both on the aggregate risk in the domestic financial system may be pos-
itive or negative. This individually rational behavior, in turn, may not be socially
optimal. An empirical characterization of the deviation of banks’ liquidity man-
agement from the social optimum, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
We focus exclusively on documenting the ways in which banks respond to fea-
tures of their business and policy environment. Our study nevertheless serves
an important purpose: it highlights the variety of factors that influence banks’ li-
quidity risk management and emphasizes the need to account properly for banks’
institutional environment when attempting to determine the adequacy of liquidity
buffers and when implementing liquidity regulation in national law.
3. The Data
3.1. Data Sources and Variable Construction
We use bank-specific, annual balance sheet data for all reporting banks from
Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database in current local-currency units for the
period from 1998 until 2007 for 30 OECD countries. We choose the start and
end date of the sample so as to capture the period between the implementation of
the Basel agreement in 1998 and the global financial crisis which started in mid-
2007. By considering this period, we reduce the risk of unobserved underlying
heterogeneity in domestic banking regulation across OECD countries, which was
harmonized by Basel I, while being able to analyze banks’ liquidity management
in "normal" times.15
We checked the data for errors, inconsistencies and changes in definitions and
converted values into constant (2005) US dollars, using the appropriate exchange
rates and the US GDP Deflator. We only retain banks for which we can ob-
tain at least 5 bank-year observations, guaranteeing sufficient intra-institutional
variation. Wherever possible, we use data recorded under the IFRS accounting
standard.16 Figure 1 (a) shows the geographic location of our observations. The
majority of banks are located in the US, followed by Germany and France. To
limit the dependence of our results on any particular country, however, we only
consider the 600 largest institutions of each country.
Our dependent variable, capturing banks’ liquidity holdings, is the share of
cash and due from banks relative to total assets. Cash is defined as cash at hand
while due from banks only includes non-interest bearing deposit accounts. An
15While there are certainly arguments in favour of incorporating the recent crisis period, we
specifically decided against it. We are particularly interested in banks’ incentives to hold liquid
assets during normal times as insurance against crises. Additionally taking into account a crisis
period would weaken the explanatory power of our results as the "clean" incentive effect would
be distorted by crisis related factors (eg actual government interventions).
16Please note that all findings reported below are robust to using the alternative Local GAAP
accounting standard where possible.
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alternative measure of liquidity employed in the literature is the ratio of liquid
assets to total deposits.17 We use the second ratio as robustness check and show
that our findings do not depend on the liquidity metric chosen. Figure 1 (b)
shows that countries have distinctly different levels of liquidity. We will analyse
these levels in more detail in Figure 2 below.
Figure 1: Various descriptives
(a) Number of observations
(b) Average liquidity
(c) Liquidity regulation
Panel (a) shows the simple sum of all bank-year observations used in the first regression
in Table 1. Panel (b) shows the simple average of liquidity. Panel (c) shows the countries
with (without) regulation in dark (light) orange.
Our contextual factors are collected by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) – combining quantitative and (survey-based) qualitative
data. Deposit insurance coverage is measured as the ratio of state-underwritten
deposits to average savings.18 Bank concentration is measured as the share of the
three largest banks’ assets in economy-wide bank assets for each country, based
on Beck et al. (2006). An index of bank disclosure requirements is provided by
the World Bank, and discussed in Huang (2006).
17See Aspachs et al. (2005) or Delechat et al. (2012).
18The variable’s source is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). See also
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005).
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Information on country-specific regulatory liquidity requirements is taken
from the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision database, described in
depth in Barth et al. (2008). Based on this survey, we calculate a dummy variable
which is 1 in case a quantitative regulatory liquidity requirement is in place and
0 otherwise. Qualitative liquidity requirements or average reserve requirements
do not qualify as liquidity regulation.19 Figure 1 (c) shows which countries do
and do not have liquidity regulation.
Additional control variables, capturing macroeconomic conditions as well as
domestic financial development, are obtained from the WDI and the IMF’s In-
ternational Financial Statistics.20
3.2. A First Look at the Data
Figure 2 illustrates the difference between the distribution of liquidity holdings
(pooled over time) in different OECD countries through a cross-country compar-
ison of Box-Whisker diagrams, of our baseline liquidity measure. The average
liquidity buffer in our sample is 1.98% of total assets.
Figure 2: Cross-Country Distribution of Liquidity, 1998-2007
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As the figure shows, country means and distributions vary substantially. Not-
ably, a liquidity requirement does not automatically imply higher liquidity buf-
fers while it does seem to be associated with a more condensed distribution of
19Given that some of the classifications might be arbitrary, we also use an alternative measure
of liquidity regulation, based on the answers to a survey circulated in the BCBS Working Group
on Liquidity (WGL). The results are qualitatively similar.
20These variables include GDP growth, inflation, short- and long-term interest rates, stock
market capitalization, government debt and financial openness.
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liquidity and higher median holdings. Banks in countries with liquidity reg-
ulation have average (median) liquidity holdings of 2.11% (2.05%) while the
average (median) liquidity buffer for banks in jurisdictions without a liquidity
requirement amounts to 2.39% (1.82%).
On top of that, banks operating in countries with smaller financial sectors or
less used currencies, like for instance Denmark or Mexico, seem to have larger li-
quidity buffers and larger variations across banks. This observation is consistent
with the discussion in Section 2. Banks in smaller financial markets face higher
individual liquidity risks because there are fewer options for cross-institutional
risk sharing through interbank markets, and smaller stockmarkets imply more
financial volatility. Moreover, if financial frictions are pervasive, this lowers re-
turns from alternative, less liquid investments in the domestic economy. In this
case, the opportunity costs of holding liquidity buffers are lower.
4. Results
4.1. The Model
Our baseline regression takes the form:
Liquiditybct = α+β1Bankbct +β2Contextct +β3Macroct +β4FinDepct + εbt (2)
where Liquiditybct measures the liquidity buffer of bank b in country c and year t.
Bankbct is a set of b(ank)-, c(ountry)- and t(ime)-varying controls which include
dummies for different business models, the bank’s (relative) size, capital and
profitability as well as the share of its total deposits in total assets. Contextct ,
Macroct and FinDepct control for c(ountry)- and t(ime)-varying aspects of the
policy environment, current macroeconomic conditions as well as the level of
financial development respectively. Finally, εbt is a b(ank)-clustered error term
which allows us, in combination with the included year and country dummies, to
estimate our model with pooled OLS without being exposed to the usual short-
comings. While we are mainly interested in the time-dimension, we need to
capture some cross-bank and -country variation to fully account for the impact
of our Context variables.
4.2. Findings
Table 1 shows that all bank-specific and contextual variables have an econom-
ically and statistically significant impact on banks’ liquidity holdings. Most of
these factors, however, are substituted by liquidity regulation. Only Disclosure
acts as complement to a liquidity requirement, thus remaining significant in pres-
ence of regulation.
Column 3 shows that on average Cooperative (-0.24%), Mortgage (-1.95%)
and Savings (-0.91%) banks hold lower liquidity buffers than their peers. Given
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Table 1: Banks’ Liquidity Holdings under different regulatory Regimes
All No Regulation Regulation
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cooperative Bank -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.24*** -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.49*** 0.14 0.15 0.21*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Cooperative*Size 0.14 0.39 0.56 1.99 -0.03 -1.88*
(0.38) (0.93) (1.30) (2.50) (0.28) (1.03)
Cooperative*Size2 -0.11 -0.96 0.71*
(0.36) (2.21) (0.36)
Investment Bank -0.42 -0.51 -0.32 -0.74** -0.37 -0.23 0.83 0.80 1.16
(0.35) (0.39) (0.45) (0.37) (0.50) (0.62) (0.79) (0.91) (1.03)
Investment*Size 1.03 -2.62 -7.31* -14.30 0.18 -5.27
(0.85) (2.70) (3.84) (10.68) (0.92) (3.46)
Investment*Size2 2.71* 35.65 3.37**
(1.49) (33.04) (1.71)
Mortgage Bank -1.77*** -1.79*** -1.95*** -0.88*** -0.64 -0.48 -1.36*** -1.38*** -1.46***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.31) (0.44) (0.57) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24)
Mortgage*Size 0.80 10.16*** -13.32 -38.73 0.70 4.63
(1.26) (3.09) (13.01) (38.24) (0.56) (3.17)
Mortgage*Size2 -12.79*** 427.18 -5.87
(3.88) (475.52) (4.12)
Savings Bank -0.88*** -0.89*** -0.91*** -1.07*** -1.11*** -1.18*** -0.16 -0.15 -0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
Savings*Size 0.68 0.26 4.87** 14.27*** -0.40 -9.09**
(0.59) (1.60) (2.08) (2.83) (0.88) (4.48)
Savings*Size2 1.22 -27.10*** 7.70**
(1.30) (6.29) (3.49)
Size 0.04 -0.01 -1.18*** -0.06 -0.10 -1.30* -0.17 -0.17 -0.03
(0.28) (0.33) (0.40) (0.45) (0.47) (0.71) (0.16) (0.19) (0.66)
Size2 0.50** 0.56 -0.06
(0.21) (0.42) (0.22)
Profit 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.09 0.09 0.09
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Capital ratio (%) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Deposits 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Disclosure 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Concentration -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
DGS -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00* -0.00** -0.00** -0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year, Macro and Fin. Dep. dummies as well as the lagged dependent included for all regressions
Constant -5.15*** -5.21*** -4.99*** 1.60 1.49 1.45 -7.17*** -7.16*** -7.22***
(0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (1.06) (1.08) (1.09) (1.67) (1.68) (1.68)
Observations 20160 20160 20160 10360 10360 10360 6486 6486 6486
R2 0.256 0.257 0.260 0.286 0.288 0.291 0.263 0.263 0.270
Note: The table shows pooled OLS estimations with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is reflected by banks’ cash and due from banks as
percentage of total assets (TA). The regression includes business model dummies while Size and Size2 are reflected by TA and TA squared over GDP.
Profit is profits over TA while Capitalratio is reflected by equity as percentage of TA. Deposits is defined as total retail deposits over TA. Disclosure is
an index describing countries’ disclosure requirements while Concentration is measured as the share of the three largest banks’ assets in economy-wide
bank assets. DGS is measured as the ratio of state-underwritten deposits to average savings.
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the relatively low mean (1.98%) and standard deviation (1.48) of our liquid-
ity variable, all these effects are economically significant. The rationale behind
these results is straightforward. The higher a bank’s liquidity risk exposure, the
larger is the incentive to hold liquid assets. Given the relatively high income
volatility and uncertainty about future cashflows, InvestmentBanks can be expec-
ted to hold more liquid assets than for instance MortgageBanks with relatively
stable and predictable cashflows.21 In the absence of liquidity regulation, size
only plays a role for MortgageBanks while suggesting a non-linear relationship
between the interaction of a bank’s business model and size with its liquidity
holdings.
An increase of Pro f it and Deposits from the 25th to the 75th percentile
(henceforth "increase") increases liquidity holdings by 0.18% and 0.25%, re-
spectively. Thus, while an institution’s Capitalratio has no effect on the size of
its liquidity buffer, its Deposits from clients have a large impact. The positive
effect of Deposits is also found by de Haan and van den End (2013) and is likely
attributable to a lack of funding diversification. Banks with large amounts of
Deposits are very concentrated in a single funding source and therefore specific-
ally prone to liquidity risks.22
Our results with respect to Size and Size2 point towards a non-linear rela-
tionship between size and banks’ liquidity buffers, suggesting that intermediate
institutions hold less liquid assets while the largest institutions have larger li-
quidity buffers. A likely explanation for this result is that systemically important
banks are subject to more peer and supervisory monitoring. In line with the-
ory, Disclosure increases liquidity holdings while Concentration reduces banks’
incentives to hold liquid assets. An increase of Disclosure increases liquidity
holdings by 0.25% while an increase of Concentration is associated with a re-
duction of liquidity holdings by 0.40%.
The presence of liquidity regulation reduces the economic and statistical sig-
nificance of several factors. Splitting our sample with respect to the presence of
liquidity regulation (columns 4 to 9) shows that regulatory requirements funda-
mentally change or substitute the determinants of banks’ liquid asset holdings.
While most factors are substituted by a liquidity regulation, our results suggest
that Disclosure and a bank’s size remain important in the presence of liquidity
regulation.23
Our results suggest that the presence of liquidity regulation changes the li-
quidity holdings of several business models. Most of these changes are driven
21Note, once again, that a bank’s business model is only a proxy for its liquidity risk exposure.
22Please note that this argument holds despite the fact that retail deposits are considered to be
the most stable source of funding.
23Please note that although Size and Size2 turn insignificant, size remains an important determ-
inant in interaction with banks’ business models.
15
by a non-linear impact of liquidity regulation on large institutions. While the
interaction with Size suggests a negative relationship between Cooperative and
SavingsBanks with liquidity holdings, the interaction with Size2 points to a pos-
itive relationship. This non-linear impact suggests that regulators pay particular
attention to the liquidity holdings of the largest institutions. Although this ap-
proach seems rational in itself, care needs to be taken not to lose track of other
risky and interconnected institutions. Profit, Deposits and Concentration have a
significant impact on liquidity holdings in the absence of liquidity regulation but
not in presence thereof. Disclosure, on the other hand, becomes more import-
ant under a liquidity requirement. The intuition behind this result is that in the
absence of liquidity regulation it is difficult for market participants, especially
retail clients, to observe an institutions’ liquidity risk. However, with liquidity
regulation and strict disclosure requirements in place, market participants have a
very clear view on institutions’ risks, which presumably increases their buffers.
Intuitively, Disclosure can be viewed as a complement to liquidity regulation
while the role of most other factors is substituted by a liquidity requirement.
Summarizing, our results show that without liquidity regulation, a combina-
tion of bank-specific (business model, profitability, deposit holdings, size) and
country-specific (disclosure requirements and concentration of the banking sec-
tor) variables determine the size of banks’ liquidity buffers. The presence of li-
quidity regulation, however, substitutes most of these bank- and country-specific
factors. An institution’s size and disclosure requirements, on the other hand,
remain significant. While the former is likely caused by increased supervisory
attention, Disclosure can be seen as a complement to a quantitative liquidity
requirement.
4.3. Robustness Checks
In this section we provide a number of robustness checks for our baseline re-
gression results (Tables A.2 through A.4). In particular, we 1) use a different
measure for liquidity regulation; 2) exploit the panel structure of our dataset; 3)
assess the robustness of our coefficients to the use of appropriate instruments
for potential endogenous variables, and 4) use another measure for banks’ risk
bearing capacity.
First, given that our liquidity regulation variable is based on a survey, some of
the answers might be noisy due to different interpretations of the questions. In or-
der to check the robustness of our results in this respect, we use the results of an-
other survey as basis for our assessment of liquidity regulation. This survey was
circulated in the BCBS’ Working Group on Liquidity (WGL) in 2007 and asked
banking supervisors to describe their current liquidity supervision while spe-
cifically distinguishing between qualitative and quantitative requirements. The
results in Table A.2 show that our baseline results are robust to using another
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measure for liquidity regulation. While there are some differences with respect
to economic and statistical significance, the pattern of the impact of liquidity
regulation is consistent across all specifications.
Second, we exploit the panel structure of our data to control for unobserved
country heterogeneity using random effects estimators.24 The random effects
model results in coefficients which are not materially different from our baseline
regression.
While it is unlikely that our business model and contextual variables include
an endogeneity bias, one could argue that a bank jointly determines its liquidity
holdings with Profit, Capital and Deposits. To address these concerns, we in-
stead included the lags of these variables in our regressions. While the lagged
values show somewhat different results, with Profit being less important and
Capital gaining a bit significance, our overall results are robust to replace all
bank-specific variables with their lags.
Finally, we use a different measure for banks’ liquidity holdings, namely cash
and due from banks over total deposits instead of total assets. Our results are
robust to this change of our dependent variable.
4.4. Shortcomings
Although we conducted several robustness checks, some caveats are in order.
First, our liquidity variable only includes cash and due from other banks and
is therefore very narrowly defined. One could think of additionally including
government bonds which are considered to be very liquid and would strengthen
the link to the LCR. However, government bonds in different countries are not
equally liquid. To avoid that our analysis is driven by products which are highly
liquid in one market while being less liquid in another market, we are focussing
on cash and due from banks, which are, by definition, permanently liquid in all
markets.
Second, we are mainly interested in the relationship between a bank’s liquid-
ity risk exposure and its liquidity risk bearing capacity. While we are able to
obtain data for the second, our measures of business model, profitability, deposit
holdings and regulatory environment are only proxies for banks’ actual liquidity
risk exposure and thus subject to measurement error. However, the purpose of
this study is to analyze the impact of banks’ policy environment on their liquidity
holdings and therefore, by definition, we need to use these proxies.
Third, when measuring the impact of liquidity regulation, we cannot distin-
guish between binding and non-binding liquidity requirements. However, over
time, a non-binding liquidity requirement is likely to have similar effects as a
24Please note that we do not run a fixed effects panel estimation given that all our regressions
include robust bank-clustered standard errors.
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strictly binding requirement. A formal requirement expects banks to stay above
a certain threshold at all times. Hence, while a (at the time) non-binding require-
ment is unlikely to have a major impact (at the time), over a period of 10 years it
will change the behavior of some banks at some point in time. Having said this,
our analysis is likely to capture the impact of all liquidity requirements at some
point while potentially overestimating the impact of non-binding requirements
while understating the impact of binding ones.
Finally, we cannot distinguish between purely local and more globally active
banks.25 Given that we are mainly interested in the impact of the institutional
environment of an institution such a distinction would enrich our analysis. At
the same time, however, even global banks are likely to be mainly influenced by
the regulation in their home country and again, given this drawback, our results
rather understate the impact of our contextual variables.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we undertake a global analysis of the determinants of banks’ liquid
asset holdings and the role of liquidity regulation. In doing so, we highlight
the role of several bank-specific and institutional variables, so-called "contextual
factors", in shaping banks’ liquidity risk management. Our main purpose is to
analyze whether the presence of liquidity regulation substitutes or complements
banks’ incentives to hold liquid assets.
Our results reveal that without liquidity regulation, banks’ liquidity buffers
are determined by a combination of bank-specific (business model, profitability,
deposit holdings, size) and country-specific (disclosure requirements, concen-
tration of the banking sector) factors. As most factors turn insignificant with a
liquidity requirement in place, we conclude that regulation substitutes most in-
centives to hold liquid assets. A bank’s disclosure requirement, however, is likely
to complement liquidity regulation, thus remaining significant in the presence
thereof. Our results further suggest that liquidity regulation leads to a non-linear
relationship between size and banks’ liquidity holdings, with the very largest
institutions holding more liquidity.
A key takeaway from our analysis is that the complementary features of dis-
closure and liquidity requirements provide strong incentives for regulators to
jointly harmonize disclosure and Basel III liquidity requirements across coun-
tries. Our results with respect to size point towards the general tendency of
overstating the impact of institution’s size on their contribution to systemic risk.
While size needs to play a role in these considerations, care needs to be taken to
25See de Haas and van Lelyveld (2010, 2013) and the literature cited therein for an analysis of
how local and global shocks affect internationally active banks.
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not understate the systemic importance of certain intermediate institutions when
defining global systemically important banks (G-SIBs).
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Table A.1: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Median sd Min Max
Liquidity All 21867 2.26 1.96 1.76 0.00 14.80
No Regulation 11471 2.39 1.82 1.94 0.00 14.79
Liquidity Regulation 10396 2.11 2.05 1.52 0.00 14.80
Cooperative Bank All 21867 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
No Regulation 11471 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
Liquidity Regulation 10396 0.54 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Investment Bank All 21867 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00
No Regulation 11471 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.00
Liquidity Regulation 10396 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.00
Mortgage Bank All 21867 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00
No Regulation 11471 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.00
Liquidity Regulation 10396 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00
Savings Bank All 21867 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00
No Regulation 11471 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00
Liquidity Regulation 10396 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00
Size All 21867 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.00 5.15
No Regulation 11471 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.00 4.52
Liquidity Regulation 10396 0.03 0.00 0.19 0.00 5.15
Profit All 21867 0.56 0.37 0.66 -2.33 3.92
No Regulation 11471 0.68 0.56 0.74 -2.33 3.92
Liquidity Regulation 10396 0.43 0.29 0.54 -2.31 3.79
Deposits All 21867 83.12 86.95 12.28 15.12 96.11
No Regulation 11471 81.84 85.25 12.50 15.12 96.11
Liquidity Regulation 10396 84.53 88.46 11.86 15.18 96.08
Disclosure All 21867 76.15 76.00 4.78 61.00 90.00
No Regulation 11471 78.54 78.00 3.86 65.00 90.00
Liquidity Regulation 10396 73.52 74.00 4.29 61.00 90.00
Concentration All 21867 52.15 55.76 21.24 21.16 100.00
No Regulation 11471 46.68 37.10 23.38 21.16 100.00
Liquidity Regulation 10396 58.19 66.49 16.63 21.38 100.00
DGS All 21867 190.71 110.98 951.55 36.83 39782.31
No Regulation 11471 243.82 239.12 1308.65 45.39 39782.31
Liquidity Regulation 10396 132.12 79.82 91.64 36.83 777.54
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Table A.2: Banks’ Liquidity Holdings under different regulatory Regimes: WGL
measure
All No Regulation Regulation
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cooperative Bank -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.24*** -0.29** -0.27* -0.28** -0.12 -0.11 -0.09
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Cooperative*Size 0.14 0.39 -0.62 -1.48 -0.32 -0.87
(0.38) (0.93) (0.82) (1.06) (0.38) (1.14)
Cooperative*Size2 -0.11 1.75** 0.19
(0.36) (0.76) (0.50)
Investment Bank -0.42 -0.51 -0.32 -0.65* -0.28 -0.05 0.60 0.58 0.91
(0.35) (0.39) (0.45) (0.38) (0.53) (0.70) (0.63) (0.73) (0.83)
Investment*Size 1.03 -2.62 -5.90 -14.31 0.11 -4.92*
(0.85) (2.70) (3.92) (10.77) (0.97) (2.92)
Investment*Size2 2.71* 37.47 3.31**
(1.49) (31.67) (1.47)
Mortgage Bank -1.77*** -1.79*** -1.95*** -0.04 0.89 1.82*** -1.23*** -1.24*** -1.33***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.60) (0.62) (0.54) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
Mortgage*Size 0.80 10.16*** -56.17*** -203.55*** 0.73 6.35**
(1.26) (3.09) (18.57) (39.87) (0.76) (3.18)
Mortgage*Size2 -12.79*** 2,978.41*** -7.77*
(3.88) (683.11) (3.99)
Savings Bank -0.88*** -0.89*** -0.91*** -1.10*** -1.11*** -1.16*** -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.49***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Savings*Size 0.68 0.26 1.88 6.91*** -0.08 -3.87
(0.59) (1.60) (1.15) (1.95) (0.65) (3.22)
Savings*Size2 1.22 -7.55*** 3.72
(1.30) (2.27) (2.47)
Size 0.04 -0.01 -1.18*** 0.05 0.06 -0.88* 0.29 0.36 -0.19
(0.28) (0.33) (0.40) (0.35) (0.37) (0.51) (0.27) (0.35) (0.78)
Size2 0.50** 0.37* 0.23
(0.21) (0.20) (0.40)
Profit 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.17** 0.17** 0.17**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Capital ratio (%) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Deposits 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Disclosure 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Concentration -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
DGS -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year, Macro and Fin. Dep. dummies as well as the lagged dependent included for all regressions
Constant -5.15*** -5.21*** -4.99*** 1.93* 1.73* 1.63 -3.60** -3.54** -3.62**
(0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (1.00) (1.02) (1.04) (1.74) (1.74) (1.77)
Observations 20160 20160 20160 10399 10399 10399 7970 7970 7970
R2 0.256 0.257 0.260 0.327 0.328 0.330 0.253 0.253 0.257
Note: The table shows pooled OLS estimations with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is reflected by banks’ by cash and due from banks as
percentage of total assets (TA). The regression includes business model dummies while Size and Size2 are reflected by TA and TA squared over GDP. Pro f it
is profits over TA while Capitalratio is reflected by equity as percentage of TA. Deposits is defined as total retail deposits over TA. Disclosure is an index
describing countries’ disclosure requirements while Concentration is measured as the share of the three largest banks’ assets in economy-wide bank assets.
DGS is measured as the ratio of state-underwritten deposits to average savings.
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Table A.3: Random effects including clustered bank effects
All No Regulation Regulation
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cooperative Bank -0.17 -0.16 -0.11 -0.16 -0.13 -0.10 0.27* 0.50*** 0.61***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20)
Cooperative*Size -2.13 -13.76*** 1.49 -5.18 -21.46** -38.45*
(2.29) (4.93) (2.40) (6.75) (8.31) (23.30)
Cooperative*Size2 63.67*** 54.23** 202.38
(21.93) (27.03) (361.78)
Investment Bank -0.32 -0.53* -0.34 -0.74*** -1.06*** -1.36*** -0.23 -2.52* 7.70
(0.36) (0.31) (0.65) (0.24) (0.23) (0.33) (0.47) (1.53) (18.28)
Investment*Size 1.63 -13.80 20.15** 58.74
(1.73) (28.76) (7.94) (36.09)
Investment*Size2 31.38 -899.81
(54.92) (732.65)
Mortgage Bank -1.84*** -1.84*** -1.95*** -1.61 -2.88* 0.73 -1.40*** -1.31*** -1.37***
(0.28) (0.29) (0.34) (1.00) (1.59) (4.62) (0.44) (0.42) (0.41)
Mortgage*Size -0.57 7.17 409.64* -2,109.36 -4.37 -5.15
(1.66) (16.12) (218.11) (3,984.30) (3.11) (17.65)
Mortgage*Size2 -4.71 363k.94 48.34
(20.12) (604k.65) (106.80)
Savings Bank -0.95*** -0.93*** -0.87*** -1.13*** -1.18*** -1.21*** 0.07 0.42** 0.64***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.19) (0.21)
Savings*Size -1.88 -17.16** 18.52*** 33.55*** -27.60*** -70.42***
(5.04) (7.10) (2.52) (12.78) (6.64) (18.08)
Savings*Size2 97.59*** -89.53 462.77***
(29.50) (59.18) (120.23)
Size -0.91 -0.38 3.76 -1.77* -2.46*** -4.18 -0.72 4.30 13.01
(0.93) (1.61) (4.22) (0.95) (0.82) (5.88) (0.74) (3.13) (18.73)
Size2 -9.43 3.52 -57.77
(8.49) (10.30) (109.49)
Profit 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.24 0.22 0.22
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
Capital ratio (%) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Deposits 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01* 0.01*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Disclosure 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.03 0.03 0.03* 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Concentration -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
DGS -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01*** -0.00** -0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year, Macro and Fin. Dep. dummies as well as the lagged dependent included for all regressions
Constant -7.02*** -6.94*** -6.87*** -2.42 -2.62* -2.59* -5.04* -5.65** -5.55*
(0.90) (0.92) (0.96) (1.53) (1.53) (1.53) (2.81) (2.79) (2.99)
Observations 12478 12478 12478 7933 7933 7933 2454 2454 2454
R2 0.324 0.324 0.325 0.341 0.342 0.343 0.255 0.270 0.276
Note: The table shows pooled OLS estimations with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is reflected by banks’ by cash and due from banks as
percentage of total assets (TA). The regression includes business model dummies while Size and Size2 are reflected by TA and TA squared over GDP. Pro f it
is profits over TA while Capitalratio is reflected by equity as percentage of TA. Deposits is defined as total retail deposits over TA. Disclosure is an index
describing countries’ disclosure requirements while Concentration is measured as the share of the three largest banks’ assets in economy-wide bank assets.
DGS is measured as the ratio of state-underwritten deposits to average savings.
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Table A.4: Endogeneity
All No Regulation Regulation
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cooperative Bank -0.09 -0.07 -0.10 -0.48*** -0.49*** -0.59*** 0.30** 0.31*** 0.39***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Cooperative*Size -0.40 -0.45 -0.38 3.21 -0.19 -2.04**
(0.44) (0.85) (1.56) (2.88) (0.30) (1.04)
Cooperative*Size2 0.04 -2.58 0.73**
(0.33) (2.59) (0.36)
Investment Bank 0.34 0.56 0.72* 0.54 0.94* 1.11* 0.03 0.01 -0.05
(0.34) (0.39) (0.43) (0.47) (0.55) (0.64) (0.42) (0.52) (0.56)
Investment*Size -1.32** -3.24** -5.08*** -8.70 0.01 0.55
(0.57) (1.38) (1.91) (5.31) (0.45) (1.56)
Investment*Size2 1.56** 9.39 -0.37
(0.73) (6.56) (0.73)
Mortgage Bank -1.40*** -1.35*** -1.41*** -0.45 -0.28 -0.47 -1.31*** -1.32*** -1.36***
(0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.43) (0.40) (0.47) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Mortgage*Size -1.18* 0.55 -6.79 4.77 0.34 2.71
(0.67) (2.00) (10.43) (29.45) (0.36) (1.88)
Mortgage*Size2 -1.41 -74.18 -3.50
(2.85) (170.00) (2.29)
Savings Bank -0.67*** -0.66*** -0.68*** -1.08*** -1.11*** -1.23*** 0.04 0.06 0.25*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Savings*Size -0.02 -0.23 4.13** 15.06*** -0.90 -15.11***
(0.53) (1.48) (1.92) (3.45) (1.12) (3.52)
Savings*Size2 0.96 -29.70*** 12.20***
(1.19) (8.65) (2.78)
Size -0.07 0.09 -1.10*** -0.03 0.04 -2.92*** -0.12 -0.06 0.05
(0.27) (0.34) (0.36) (0.52) (0.55) (0.62) (0.14) (0.18) (0.62)
Size2 0.52*** 1.56*** -0.05
(0.18) (0.34) (0.21)
Profit_lag1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
basiccapitalratio_lag1 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Deposits_lag1 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Disclosure 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Concentration 0.00* 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
DGS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Year, Macro and Fin. Dep. dummies as well as the lagged dependent included for all regressions
Constant -3.20*** -3.18*** -3.09*** 0.80 0.87 1.09 -7.41*** -7.37*** -7.60***
(0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (1.13) (1.14) (1.14) (1.77) (1.77) (1.76)
Observations 14369 14369 14369 5300 5300 5300 6410 6410 6410
R2 0.108 0.110 0.115 0.101 0.106 0.119 0.232 0.232 0.241
Note: The table shows pooled OLS estimations with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is reflected by banks’ by cash and due from banks as
percentage of total assets (TA). The regression includes business model dummies while Size and Size2 are reflected by TA and TA squared over GDP. Pro f it
is profits over TA while Capitalratio is reflected by equity as percentage of TA. Deposits is defined as total retail deposits over TA. Disclosure is an index
describing countries’ disclosure requirements while Concentration is measured as the share of the three largest banks’ assets in economy-wide bank assets.
DGS is measured as the ratio of state-underwritten deposits to average savings.
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